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Abstract
In Aspex Eyewear v. Miracle Optics, a patent infringement claim was initially dismissed because the court
found that the parties bringing suit, a patentee and a patent sub-licensee, lacked standing because although
the patentee had given all substantial rights to a licensee, the sub-licensee’s license did not convey “all
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substantial rights.” Thus, neither party had “all substantial rights,” the traditional threshold test for patent
licensee standing. While the Federal Circuit ultimately reversed and allowed the suit to go forward, the case

>>

demonstrates how the current patent standing rule only magnifies the expense of litigating an infringement
suit by requiring additional resources for debating “all substantial rights.” This Article analyzes the current
standing rules for licensees of intellectual property under the various federal intellectual property statutes. In

Shidler Center
UW School of Law

general, exclusive licensees have standing to sue, either alone or by joining the licensor. Although the
fundamental motivation for this rule is sound, the rule can be unnecessarily rigid as applied and can prevent
licensing arrangements from reflecting the intent of the parties. This article will also analyze FRCP 19’s
approach, which provides a more flexible and predictable rule.
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INTRODUCTION
<1>Licensing

of intellectual property is a significant business, with U.S. receipts of royalties and fees from trade in

intellectual property totaling $48.3 billion in 2003.2 Unfortunately, commerce in IP licensing does not always easily
mesh with existing IP law. As a result, counsel involved in IP licensing transactions struggle to discern what terms
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are required for their clients, who may be overprotected or underprotected, with transaction costs 3 needlessly
increased. 4 Moreover, litigating infringement lawsuits is expensive, with the median cost to each party of litigating
a patent infringement suit through trial being five hundred thousand dollars where “the stakes are relatively
modest,” and rising to four million dollars where there is more than twenty-five million dollars at risk. 5 In Aspex
Eyewear v. Miracle Optics, a patent infringement claim was initially dismissed because the court found that the
parties bringing suit, a patentee and a patent sub-licensee, lacked standing because although the patentee had
given all substantial rights to a licensee, the sub-licensee’s license did not convey “all substantial rights.” Thus,
neither party had “all substantial rights,” the traditional threshold test for patent licensee standing. On appeal,
however, the Federal Circuit reversed, allowing the suit to go forward. This case demonstrated how the current
patent standing rule only magnifies the expense of litigating an infringement suit by requiring additional resources
for debating “all substantial rights.” 6 In addition to monetary dissuasion from bringing a lawsuit, licensors are less
capable of detecting unauthorized use, and may not have as strong an interest in suing infringers.7 As a result, it
is often necessary that licensees have the flexibility to file lawsuits themselves. However, current standing rules
unnecessarily prevent a patent licensee from suing in certain scenarios.
<2>This

Article outlines current standing rules for licensees of various forms of intellectual property and examines

the rationale behind them. Ultimately, the Article will conclude that the traditional patent standing rule is
unnecessary in light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 (“FRCP 19” or “Rule 19”). Rule 19 addresses both of the
concerns underlying the traditional test, but also provides a more efficient rule, for it does not always require the
joinder of the patentee-licensor in order for the exclusive licensee to pursue an infringement claim. That is, where
patent infringement is within the scope of the exclusive license, validity is not at issue,8 and the licensor has not
reserved the right to sue, there is no reason to require joinder, which unnecessarily magnifies the costs of
litigation and, in turn, transaction costs. 9 This Article describes some of the common situations in which license
agreements may have unintended consequences, and concludes with practice pointers for counsel working under
the current rules to help avoid potential pitfalls of patent licensing agreements.

CURRENT STANDING RULES FOR LICENSEES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
<3>A

nonexclusive license grants a right to use the IP without being sued for infringement – and nothing more. 10

By contrast, an exclusive license grants not only a right to use the IP without fear of being sued for infringement,
but also the licensor’s covenant not to license the IP to any other party, and the right to make, use, and sell the
intellectual property. As such, exclusive licensees enjoy freedom from competition to the extent of the scope of the
license. 11 In general, nonexclusive licensees have no standing to sue. In contrast, exclusive licensees generally do
have standing to sue, either in their own name or by joining the licensor, depending on the type of IP involved.

Patents
<4>Under

35 U.S.C. § 281, “[a] patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent.” Section

100(d) defines “patentee” to include “not only the patentee to whom the patent was issued, but also the
successors in title to the patentee.” Thus, the term “patentee” includes assignees. In determining whether an
assignment has occurred, courts traditionally look to whether there has been a transfer of “all substantial rights
under the patent” to the licensee, who in effect becomes an assignee. 12 Thus, not only patentees but also
assignees (or exclusive licensees holding “all substantial rights”) of a patent may sue for infringement. 13
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<5>In

addition, exclusive licensees not holding “all substantial rights” may generally sue for infringement upon

joining the patentee-licensor. Courts have insisted upon joinder of the patentee-licensor for two primary reasons:
(1) to avoid multiple lawsuits so that an infringer may only be sued once for the same infringing activity, 14 and
(2) to prevent a court from invalidating a patent without the patentee-licensor having the opportunity to defend its
patent, because an infringement claim is often answered with a challenge to the patent’s validity.15 Exclusive
patent licensees do have standing to sue in their own names where the patentee-licensor is the infringer.16
Nonexclusive patent licensees are denied standing to sue for infringement. 17 Courts have denied standing to
nonexclusive licensees because, since the licensor retains the ability to grant additional licenses, the “nonexclusive
license[e] suffers no legal injury from infringement and, thus, has no standing to bring suit or even join in a suit
with the patentee.” 18

Copyrights
<6>Exclusive

copyright licensees do have standing to sue in their own names.19 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) provides that

“[t]he legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled . . . to institute an action for any
infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it.” Moreover, a “copyright owner”
expressly includes an exclusive licensee.20 In this regard, copyright standing reflects the economic realities of
copyright value. Like patent standing remains today, copyright standing once reflected a view of the property as
“indivisible,” meaning that an assignment that would confer standing could only be made of an undivided
interest. 21 Anything less than all rights was a mere license. While patent law retained this view, as reflected in its
standing rule, copyright evolved and is now viewed as “divisible,” 22 with courts relying on FRCP 19 to determine
questions of standing and joinder. This difference may be explained, in part, by reference to the underlying IP:
copyrights are more prone to being divided, and copyrights are less frequently invalidated than patents.23
However, the nature of copyright does not fully explain the difference in the way the law has progressed, and
even commentators who acknowledge that copyrights are more prone to division continue to view patent
indivisibility as an “outmoded concept.” 24
<7>In

addition to copyright infringement, Congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. This statute

provides much broader standing than for copyright infringement, granting standing to “[a]ny person injured by a
violation” of the anti-circumvention 25 and anti-trafficking 26 rules. 27 As such, even nonexclusive licensees likely
have standing to enforce these new rights. 28

Trademarks
<8>Trademark

licensees may or may not have standing to sue in their own names, depending on whether the

trademark is registered or not.29

Registered Trademarks
<9>Standing

for infringement of federally registered trademarks is restricted to “the registrant,” and thus even

exclusive licensees have no standing to sue in their own names.30 This rule of standing invokes the same
justification as the analogous rule for patent standing: defendants often respond to an infringement suit by
http://www.lctjournal.washington.edu/Vol4/a07Bashaw.html[3/18/2010 11:47:35 AM]
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challenging the validity of the IP. 31 Thus, it is appropriate in these cases for the registrant to be a party, since it
“bears the risk of invalidity or restriction.”32

Unregistered Trademarks & Trade Dress
<10> Exclusive

licensees do have standing to sue for infringement of unregistered trademarks and trade dress under

section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 33 In fact, because the statute grants standing to “any person who believes that
he or she is likely to be damaged” by an infringing act, nonexclusive licensees also have standing here.34 This rule
is justified by the fact that a purpose of trademarks is not merely to protect businesses, but also the consuming
public. 35 Courts have also granted standing to exclusive licensees under common law.36

CRITIQUE OF RATIONALE FOR DENYING STANDING TO EXCLUSIVE LICENSEES IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASES
<11> The

current judicial patent standing rule denies licensees who lack “all substantial rights” standing to sue in

their own names as a means of avoiding multiple lawsuits and reserving to patentee-licensors the ability to defend
the validity of their patents.37 However, the current rule is unnecessary in light of FRCP 19. 38 Rule 19 adequately
provides for the joinder of patentee-licensors where necessary, but, unlike the traditional rule, not where
unnecessary. 39 According to Rule 19, a party is to be joined if:
(1) in the person’s absence complete relief cannot be accorded . . ., or (2) the person claims an
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the
person’s absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect that
interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest.
<12> As

such, Rule 19 effectively addresses both of the concerns underlying the current rule. In fact, a few courts

have held that Rule 19 displaced the traditional rule.40 Nevertheless, most courts decline to rely on Rule 19 in
patent infringement cases, and instead continue to rely on the traditional standing rules. However, not only is Rule
19 sufficient, it is the better rule as it is more efficient than the traditional rule, for under Rule 19 a patenteelicensor need not always join in order for an exclusive licensee to pursue an infringement claim.
<13> The

current rule may be inefficient because where parties anticipate uncertainty of standing and the possibility

of being required to litigate unnecessarily, and as a result attempt to draft around the default rule, transaction
costs are driven higher. In contrast, in copyright there is no need to belabor license versus assignment (“all
substantial rights”) because standing is automatic, and if necessary, the licensor is joined under Rule 19. 41 As
such, less time is spent (1) negotiating and contracting for “all substantial rights,” and (2) litigating whether “all
substantial rights” were granted. 42 As a result, Rule 19 reflects the common-sense approach that parties should
only be joined where necessary, as this likely best approximates the provisions that the parties themselves would
have adopted. A party is not necessary where the infringement is within the scope of the exclusive license, validity
is not at issue, and the licensor has not reserved the right to sue. 43
<14> In

addition to the current patent rule’s inefficiency, its existence also indicates, in light of copyright standing,

that the law is not progressing logically, because the same concerns underlying the patent standing rule exist for
copyright law. In Wales Industrial, Inc. v. Hasbro Bradley, Inc.,44 the court first noted that whether the transfer
was “denominated an assignment or an exclusive license [was] of no consequence,” and then invoked FRCP 19 to
http://www.lctjournal.washington.edu/Vol4/a07Bashaw.html[3/18/2010 11:47:35 AM]
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direct the licensee-manufacturer to be joined by the licensor-author of a copyright because (1) the copyrights’
validity was in issue and (2) failing to join the author would have subjected the alleged infringers to the risk of
multiple lawsuits and conflicting judgments as to the validity of the copyrights. 45 This case demonstrates that
FRCP 19 provides a sufficient mechanism for courts to achieve these two important policy goals underlying the
patent rule, but also retains the flexibility to decline joinder where it serves no useful purpose. No useful purpose
is served in joining the licensor where the infringement is within the scope of the exclusive license, validity is not
at issue, and the licensor has not reserved the right to sue. 46

BENEFITS OF EXCLUSIVE PATENT LICENSEES BEING ABLE TO SUE IN THEIR OWN NAMES
<15> It

would be beneficial for exclusive licensees who lack “all substantial rights” to nonetheless have the ability to

sue in their own names. First, granting exclusive licensees the ability to sue in their own name would make it
easier to effect the intent of the parties where the licensor intended not to retain the right to join pending
litigation. 47 In Aspex, a party who received “(1) the exclusive right to make, use, and sell products covered by
the patent; (2) the right to sue for infringement of the patent; and (3) a virtually unrestricted authority to
sublicense its rights under the agreement” was found to lack standing, merely because there was a hard
termination date, and as such it was technically possible for an infringer to be subject to multiple lawsuits. 48 In
this situation, and others, though the parties have apparently intended to give exclusive licensees the right to sue
for infringement, the default rules prohibited such action. 49
<16> Second,

exclusive licensee standing would lower transaction costs, because the contours of these investments

would be crisper and less uncertain.50 Where the intended consequences of transactions are likely to be affirmed
in court, the parties spend less time belaboring the wording of their agreements. Rule 19’s flexibility allows a court
to join as necessary, rather than force contracting parties to spend time establishing “all substantial rights,” both
in advance when contracting, and in court when litigating. Moreover, when the licensor is involved in litigation only
where necessary,51 the price of the license better reflects its economic value. That is, where infringement is within
the scope of the exclusive license, validity is not at issue, and the licensor has not reserved the right to sue, there
is no reason to require joinder, which needlessly multiplies the costs of litigation and, in turn, transaction costs. As
such, the current rules, by not approximating the provisions the parties would have adopted, raise the cost of
contracting.52
<17> Finally,

standing for exclusive licensees makes sense because the exclusive licensee is often the party with the

keenest interest in enforcing rights against infringers,

53

and also often the party with the best ability to do so. 54

CONCLUSION
<18> In

general, nonexclusive licensees have no standing to sue, but exclusive licensees usually do have standing,

either in their own names or by joining the licensor. The traditional patent standing rule requires the joinder of the
licensor where the transfer was anything less than a transfer of all substantial rights (i.e., an assignment) in order
to avoid multiple lawsuits for the same infringing activity and in order to prevent the invalidation of a patent
without the patentee having the opportunity to defend its patent. However, this rule is unnecessary in light of
FRCP 19, which effectively ensures that both of the concerns underlying the traditional rule are adequately
addressed. Moreover, FRCP 19 is more efficient, as it retains the flexibility to decline to require joinder where doing
so serves no useful purpose, such as where the infringement is within the scope of the exclusive license, validity is
not at issue, and the licensor has not reserved the right to sue.
http://www.lctjournal.washington.edu/Vol4/a07Bashaw.html[3/18/2010 11:47:35 AM]
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<19> Working

under the current rules, parties contemplating an IP licensing arrangement should be aware that their

ability to sue third party infringers depends not only upon the type of IP, but also the type of license they hold.
Subtle differences in the wording and structure of a license can alter the intended relationship, with significant
consequences. In particular, the current patent standing rules require parties to ensure their agreements grant “all
substantial rights” if the licensor does not wish to be a party to infringement litigation. In light of the current
rules, parties to a licensing arrangement should consider adopting joint-enforcement and joint-defense clauses to
ensure that each party gets what it thought it was bargaining for.

PRACTICE POINTERS FOR PATENT LICENSEES
Contractual terms cannot give a patent licensee standing,55 but a carefully worded license can avoid some of the
unintended consequences resulting from the current standing rules.
Practice Pointer 1—Where the goal is to grant an exclusive licensee “all substantial rights.”
Although licensee standing is evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances56 looking to both
the intention of the parties and the substance of what was granted, 57 there are certain terms that are
most important to determining standing.58
The grantor’s reservation of rights of use or marketing: Fewer than all substantial rights are transferred
where a licensor retains a limited right to develop and market the patented invention.59 Moreover, an
agreement must explicitly address this if it had been the arrangement in the past. 60
Rights to sue third parties for infringement: “All substantial rights” requires the right to sue third
parties for infringement. 61 However, this alone is insufficient: fewer than all substantial rights are
transferred where a patent owner retains even the first right to sue for infringement. 62 Moreover, the
right to sue solely for commercial infringement, while the licensor retains the right to sue for noncommercial infringement, 63 is insufficient to transfer all substantial rights. 64 Finally, the licensor
retaining the right to approve litigation settlements is inconsistent with a transfer of all substantial
rights. 65
Licensee’s ability to transfer the license: A license whereby a licensor retains a right to veto
sublicenses or reassignments may transfer less than all substantial rights, 66 or such a veto right may
not destroy “all substantial rights.” 67 Whether such a right destroys “all substantial rights” likely
depends on the surrounding circumstances. 68 Thus, if the transfer is starting to resemble a license in
other ways, this factor may tip the scales.
Termination and renewal provisions: All substantial rights may be transferred even where the license
terminates upon the occurrence of certain events, such as the licensee filing for bankruptcy or ceasing
production of the patented product. 69 All substantial rights may be transferred for discrete periods of
time. For instance, a two-year period followed by successive, one-year periods renewable at the
discretion of the licensor can be a transfer of all substantial rights. 70 However, where there is a “hard”
termination date beyond which the license cannot be renewed, the exclusive licensee lacks standing to
sue in its own name. 71
http://www.lctjournal.washington.edu/Vol4/a07Bashaw.html[3/18/2010 11:47:35 AM]
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Practice Pointer 2—Special Considerations for IP holding companies or sister corporations .

72

Parties should be cognizant of the consequences of separating legal ownership of a patent from the
seller of a patented product.
If a sister corporation is to manufacture, use, or sell a product or process covered by a patent which is
licensed by another sister corporation, it is important that the sister corporation have an exclusive
license. A court will not impute the lost profits of a sister corporation which lacks standing to sue to
another sister corporation which does have standing to sue. 73 In this situation, either the company
that owns the patent should also sell the product, or the license should be made exclusive. 74
The IP holding company scenario is also problematic because exclusive licensees currently lack
independent standing. As such, parties should avoid getting a “license to license.” For instance, a
company which received a license which required the licensee to sublicense to a subsidiary is not a
transfer of all substantial rights, and as such neither the licensee nor sub-licensee could sue in their
own names.75 With this in mind, parties should structure license agreements so that the party that will
actually produce is the initial licensee rather than a required sub-licensee.
Practice Pointer 3—Contractual Claims. Although a contract clause cannot confer standing,76 it can
help demonstrate that the intent was to convey “all substantial rights.” Moreover, a joint-enforcement
or joint-defense clause can be used as leverage to encourage a licensor-patentee to sue, because
failure to do so can give rise to a claim for breach of contract. Finally, recognizing that, under the
current standing rules, one party may have the discretion to sue, parties to a license should consider
including joint-enforcement or joint-defense clauses whereby both parties can demand that the other
sue when the property is infringed, and whereby the proceeds or costs of litigation are apportioned
among the parties. 77
<< Top
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35. See Dratler, supra note 6, at § 8.01[2][e], § 8.06[4][b][i].
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36. Id. at § 8.06[4][b][ii].
37. See Independent Wireless Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 269 U.S. 459 (1926). However,
“[t]he modern-day standing rules in patent law have their roots in a series of nineteenth-century
United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Patent Act as it existed at that time” and are
too rigid today. Blair & Cotter, supra note 7, at 1336, 1406-07.
38. Traditional patent standing rules significantly predate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Dratler,
supra note 6, at § 8.06[1] (note 24.9) (“The rule that mere licensees cannot sue dates from . . .
Littlefield v. Perry, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 205, 223, 2 L.Ed. 577 (1875),” “[t]he rule that patentees must
be joined dates from the Independent Wireless Telegraph case in 1926,” and “[t]he Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were first promulgated in 1938”).
39. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 (“Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication”). See also Dratler, supra note
6, at § 8.06[1][c] (Stating that the policy concerns underlying the traditional standing rule “could be
handled adequately by proper compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19….Indeed, Rule 19(a)
of the Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly implements both policies of the patent standing rules, requiring
courts to consider the possibility of multiple suits . . . .” And concluding that “[t]here is no logical
reason under modern procedure to require the patentee’s joinder in all cases—let alone to elevate the
question of joinder to the level of a jurisdictional defect” which only “needlessly multiplies expense and
complexity in already complex litigation”); Blair & Cotter, supra note 7, at 1406-07 (“[M]andatory
joinder under Rule 19 is likely to be the most appropriate vehicle for protecting those interests without
giving rise to multiple litigation” and “there is no overriding need for the type of rigid standing rules
exemplified by Waterman” and the traditional patent standing rules).
40. While most courts, including the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, still follow the Independent Wireless
test, some courts have held that Rule 19 displaced those traditional tests. See Blair & Cotter, supra
note 7, at 1351. The requirement that licensees have standing only where “all substantial rights” are
conveyed is judge-made, and thus subject to reversal in the same way as in State St. Bank & Trust
Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding that there is no prohibition in
U.S. law on business method patents, thus departing from the prior business-method exception to
patentability). See also Parkson Corp. v. Fruit of the Loom, Inc., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1066, 1068-69 (E.D.
Ark. 1992) (“Certainly, the traditional rule has been that when the interest transferred is deemed a
license, the patent-holder is a necessary party because the patent holder is still the real party in
interest with respect to the validity of the patent . . . .However, the adoption of the 1966 amendment
to Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure makes clear that patent owners are not per se
indispensable parties in infringement actions”); Erbamont, Inc. v. Cetus Corp., 720 F. Supp. 387, 39394 (D. Del. 1989) (Finding that licensors were necessary parties under Rule 19(a), but “declin[ing] to
definitively label the agreement . . . a license or an assignment” because “many cases fall in the
middle of these two extremes”); Rainville Co., Inc. v. Consupak, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 221, 223 (D.N.J.
1976) (“[T]his court is in agreement…that the approach set forth in Rule 19 of the Fed.R.Civ.P., and
not the older cases…is to control the determination of the joinder issue”).
41. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 7, at 1370-71.
42. See Dratler, supra note 6, at § 8.06[1][c] (2006).
43. See id.
44. Wales Industrial, Inc. v. Hasbro Bradley, Inc., 612 F.Supp. 510, 516-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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45. Id.; See also 82 A.L.R. Fed. 509.
46. See Dratler, supra note 6, at § 8.06[1].
47. Intent does currently control courts’ resolution of standing, but intent in this context involves whether
“all substantial rights” were intended to be transferred. See Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Genetics
Institute, Inc., 52 F.3d 1026, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“To resolve the issue of standing, we must
examine the licensing agreement to determine whether the parties intended to effect a transfer of
proprietary rights to the licensee as an incident to protection of its interests”) (citing Vaupel).
48. Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Miracle Optics, Inc., 434 F.3d 1336, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (emphasis
added).
49. See also Poly-America, L.P. v. GSE Lining Technology, Inc., 383 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Plaintiff
patent-owner not allowed to claim the lost profits of its sister corporation, which actually sold the
goods, because the sister corporation did so under a non-exclusive license); Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. ARoo Co., 222 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Sub-licensees lacked standing to maintain an infringement
suit in their own names because the primary licensee’s rights under the agreement were significantly
diminished by a sub-license requirement, and as such the licensing agreement did not transfer all
substantial rights in the patent).
50. However, the counterargument can be made that reliance on Rule 19 simply shifts uncertainties from
one aspect of the license to another by granting courts discretion in determining joinder.
51. Dratler, supra note 6, at § 8.06[1][c] (“when an accused infringer’s acts fall within the scope of an
exclusive license, when the patentee has reserved no right to sue for those acts, and when no
counterclaim or defense attacking the patent itself is raised, requiring the patentee to be joined
needlessly multiplies expense and complexity in already complex litigation”).
52. Hugh Collins, Regulating the Employment Relation for Competitiveness, 30 Indus. L.J. 17, 40 (2001),
available at http://ilj.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/30/1/17.pdf (“A change in default rules is only
beneficial in the sense of saving on transaction costs if the rule corresponds to the term of the
contract which the parties would have agreed if they had continued to negotiate every item in the
contract”).
53. An exclusive licensee would be the party with the keenest interest in enforcing its rights most
particularly where the license is a flat rate, rather than a royalty. In a royalty arrangement, the
licensor benefits from increased sales to the licensee, whereas in a flat rate arrangement, the licensor
is paid the same amount regardless of the licensee’s sales.
54. Jeffrey L. Van Hoosear, Licensing Lessons: The Blackberry and eBay Cases, July 2006,
http://www.kmob.com/pdf/Backberry_Ebay.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2007).
55. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Genetics Institute, Inc., 52 F.3d 1026, 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (despite a
clause in a license purporting to grant standing, a nonexclusive licensee lacks standing). See also
Dratler, supra note 6, at § 8.06.
56. Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
57. Id.
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58. See Penril Datacomm Networks v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 934 F. Supp. 708, 711 (D. Md. 1996) (“restraint
on alienation is clearly at odds with true ownership . . . .[T]he critical flaw in the [Licensee]/[Licensor]
arrangement as it bears on [Licensee’s] standing is the nonexclusivity of [Licensee’s] right to make,
use and sell Patent . . . .the ‘most important’ right under any patent [is] the right to sue third-party
infringers”). See also Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alza Corp., 804 F. Supp. 614, 633 (D.N.J. 1992) (finding the
right to sue for infringement as a factor in favor of “assignment,” and that the licensee did not need to
join the patent owner where the license had transferred “substantial rights to exclusivity, to transfer,
and to initiate a lawsuit under the patent”). See also Surgical Laser Technologies, Inc. v. Laser
Industries, Ltd., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1593 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (finding that an exclusive license agreement had
provided the licensee with sufficient rights to maintain an action in its own name, even where the
owner of the patent, the University of Washington, retained the right to certain academic and noncommercial uses, the right to consent to any judgment or any other voluntary disposition of a suit
brought by licensee, not to be unreasonably withheld, and the right to intervene in any declaratory
action alleging invalidity or non-infringement brought against the licensee).
59. Fieldturf, Inc. v. Southwest Recreational Industries, 357 F.3d 1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing
Abbott Laboratories v. Diamedix Corp., 47 F.3d 1128, 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
60. Id. (“Notably, the 1998 agreement did not address, as the 1994 agreement had, whether [licensor], or
[licensee], would have the right to enforce the. . .patent against infringers. The 1998 agreement also
did not address, as the 1994 agreement had, whether [licensor] would retain the right to ‘develop,
display, commercialize, and market’ embodiments of the patent. These omissions are significant.” The
1994 agreement had granted the licensor these rights, and the absence of explicit mention of them in
the 1998 agreement was found to mean that the terms had not changed. Thus, the Court went on to
find that, without granting the licensee the right to enforce the patent, either explicitly or impliedly,
the document conveyed no more than a bare license).
61. See Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Miracle Optics, Inc., 434 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“A key fact has
often been where the right to sue for infringement lies”). See also Vaupel, 944 F.2d at 875-76 (the
right to enforce the patent is “particularly dispositive” of standing issues because of the underlying
policy to prevent “two suits on the same patent against a single infringer”); Mentor H/S, Inc., v.
Medical Device Alliance, Inc., 240 F.3d 1016, 1018 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“In Vaupel, the grant of the right
to sue for infringement, subject only to the obligation to inform the patentee, was particularly
dispositive of our conclusion that Vaupel was an exclusive licensee with all substantial rights in the
patent and could bring suit in its own name. Vaupel, 944 F.2d at 875, 20 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) at 1049.
Here, in light of [Licensor’s] substantial retained rights, particularly its initial right and obligation to sue
for infringement, we conclude that [Licensee] did not receive all substantial rights in the patent”); and
Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alza Corp., 804 F. Supp. 614, 630 (D.N.J. 1992) (finding the right to sue for
infringement as a factor in favor of “assignment”).
62. Mentor, 240 F.3d at 1018 (Exclusive licensee lacked standing where licensor “most importantly,. . . has
the first obligation to sue parties for infringement; failure to take appropriate action against infringers
would constitute a breach of the agreement. [Licensee] only can sue for infringement in the event
[Licensor] fails to do so”).
63. Non-commercial infringement refers to use by “non-commercial customers…like governmental entities,
the military and universities . . . .” Sicom Systems Ltd. v. Agilent Technologies, Inc., 427 F.3d 971,
974 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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64. Id. at 979 (Licensee lacked standing to sue in own name because “[Licensee’s] exclusive right to sue
for ‘commercial’ infringement does not signify that [Licensee] has the exclusive right to sue for all
infringement”).
65. Id. at 979 (“Additionally, we find that Sicom, in other respects as well, has failed to show that it has all
substantial rights under the patent. For instance, Sicom does not have the right to settle litigation
without the prior written consent from Canada. . . .”).
66. Id. at 978-79 (Noting that licensor retained “the right to veto [Licensee’s] reassignment of its rights or
proposed sublicenses” was inconsistent with all substantial rights, because “‘just as the right to
alienate personal property is an essential indicia of ownership, the right to further assign patent rights
is implicit in any true assignment,’” quoting Calgon Corp. v. Nalco Chemical Co., 726 F. Supp. 983, 988
(D.C. Del. 1989).
67. Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (finding
that none of a series of reserved rights, including the right to veto sublicenses, “was so substantial as
to reduce the transfer to a mere license or indicate an intent not to transfer all substantial rights”).
68. Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Miracle Optics, Inc., 434 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“To determine
whether an agreement to transfer rights to a patent at issue amounts to an assignment or a license,
we must ascertain the intention of the parties and examine the substance of what was granted.
Vaupel, 944 F.2d at 874 (explaining that the court must examine whether the agreements transferred
all substantial rights to the patent at issue and whether the surrounding circumstances indicated an
intent to do so)”).
69. Vaupel, 944 F.2d at 874 (Plaintiff’s standing to sue in own name was upheld despite termination clause
whereby the license would terminate automatically if the licensee filed for bankruptcy or stopped
production of the patented product). See also Snap-On, Inc. v. Hunger Engineering Co., 29 F. Supp.
2d 965, 969 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (citing with approval Vaupel’s finding that retention of a reversionary
right does not show an intent not to transfer all substantial rights).
70. Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“ . . . neither the termination
clause nor the renewal cycle of the license agreement . . . required [Licensor] to be joined in this
action”).
71. Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 60 F. Supp. 2d 104, 109-10 (W.D.N.Y. 1999)
(infringement suit brought by exclusive licensee required joinder of patentee because the license was
for a finite term of five years). See also Aspex, 434 F.3d 1336 (a termination provision in a license
agreement precludes a transfer of all substantial rights where the license runs for less than the full
term of the patent).
72. IP holding companies, in a variety of forms, comprise a significant percentage of IP licensing
transactions. In 2003, seventy-five percent of the U.S. receipts of royalties and fees from trade in
intellectual property took place between U.S. companies and their foreign affiliates. National Science
Board, supra note 2.
73. Poly-America, L.P. v. GSE Lining Technology, Inc., 383 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Plaintiff patentowner not allowed to claim the lost profits of its sister corporation, which actually sold the goods under
a non-exclusive license granted by sister corporation patent-owner). See also Carver v. Velodyne
Acoustics, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (W.D. Wash. 2002). In this situation the rules appear to be too
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rigid, since the same interests are represented. Moreover, prior case law had stated a goal was to
compensate for all harm. Here, however, the standing rules appear to be foreclosing that possibility.
See Shari Fleishman Esfahani, IP Holding Companies Beware: Lessons from the Poly-America Case, The
Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, Vol. 13, No. 9 (September 2005), available at
http://www.akingump.com/docs/publication/801.pdf#search=%22metropolitan%20corporate%20counsel%20licensee%22
. See also King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 947 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“This court must reject
Tapematic's challenge” that “lost profits can be awarded only to one who makes or sells the patented
device.” Rather, “[t]he section’s broad language awards damages for any injury as long as it resulted
from the infringement”). See also Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelly Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545-46 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (Noting that “[n]otwithstanding the broad language of § 284, judicial relief cannot redress every
conceivable harm that can be traced to an alleged wrongdoing,” yet also noting that “the Supreme
Court has interpreted this to mean that ‘adequate’ damages should approximate those damages that
will fully compensate the patentee for infringement. Further, the Court has cautioned against imposing
limitations on patent infringement damages”).
74. See Esfahani, supra note 73.
75. Prima Tek, 222 F.3d 1372 (Sub-licensees lacked standing to maintain an infringement suit in their own
names because the primary licensee’s rights under the agreement were significantly diminished by a
sub-license requirement, and as such the licensing agreement did not transfer all substantial rights in
the patent).
76. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Genetics Institute, Inc., 52 F.3d 1026, 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[A]
contract cannot change the statutory requirement for suit to be brought by the ‘patentee.’ By the same
token, a right to sue clause cannot negate the requirement that, for co-plaintiff standing, a licensee
must have beneficial ownership of some of the patentee's proprietary rights. A patentee may not give a
right to sue to a party who has no proprietary interest in the patent”) (citing Crown Die & Tool Co. v.
Nye Tool & Machine Works, 261 U.S. 24, 44, 67 L.Ed. 516, 43 S.Ct. 254 (1923)). See also Prima Tek,
222 F.3d at 1381 (“Just as a ‘right to sue’ clause cannot confer standing on a bare licensee, neither
can a patent owner's agreement to be bound by judgments against a licensee circumvent the rule of
Independent Wireless that the patent owner must ordinarily join, in any infringement action, an
exclusive licensee who possesses less than all substantial rights in the patent.”).
77. See, e.g., Poly-America, 383 F.3d at 1311 (“ . . . parties to a lawsuit may allocate the disposition of
infringement damages between themselves . . . .”).
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